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RULE 11: ENTERING A NEW ERA
William W Schwarzer*
Extensive amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) went into effect on December 1, 1993, including a significant
revision of Rule 11.1 That Rule has long been controversial;2 the 1993
amendments are intended to make it less so? At the same time they
build on an initiative that first appeared in the 1983 amendment of
Rule 11. While to that time the FRCP had been largely procedural
regulations, the 1983 amendment was the first substantial attempt to
regulate lawyers' behavior.' The 1993 amendments advance this initi-
ative. In doing so they raise new issues concerning the way in which
Rule 11 should be interpreted and applied. This Article will examine
the background of the 1993 amendments, analyze the principal
changes in the Rule in the context of other FRCP changes made in
1993, and then consider how the amendments may affect the courts'
interpretation of the revised Rule and, in particular, of the obligations
of attorneys under it.
I. BACKGROUND-THE 1983 AMENDMENT
Rule 11, as originally adopted in 1937,5 provided that an attor-
ney's signature on a pleading certified that there was good ground to
* Senior United States District Judge, Northern District of California; Director, Fed-
eral Judicial Center. The views expressed are the Author's and not necessarily those of the
Center or its Board.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Proposed Amendments].
2. The Rule has spawned a profusion of law review articles, other commentary, and a
number of studies. See generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW
OF LITIGATION ABUSE (2d ed. 1994) (analyzing history of Rule 11 sanctions and applica-
tions of 1993 amendments); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PER-
SPECTrVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (2d ed. 1993) (evaluating practice under Rule 11
and summarizing authorities).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
advisory committee's notes, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 583 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 advi-
sory committee's notes].
4. See, e.g., 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (2d ed. 1990) ("The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 ... address the
problems of pretrial cost and delay by emphasizing the need to improve attorney
behavior.").
5. Rule 11, however, was not the first provision authorizing imposition of sanctions.
As far back as 1813, Congress adopted legislation providing that any attorney who "multi-
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support the pleading and that it was not interposed for delay. The
Rule also stated that a pleading signed "with intent to defeat the pur-
pose of the rule ... may be stricken [and that] [flor a wilful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action."6 During the succeeding forty-five years, the Rule proved to
be ineffective and little used.7 Beginning in the late 1970s, a chorus of
complaints arose about increasing litigation abuse and judges' reluc-
tance to impose sanctions. It is difficult to identify the factual basis for
the complaints of abuse. However, it is clear that the volume of civil
litigation in the federal courts-and probably its adversariness-had
increased and with it the volume of complaints. A number of other
factors may also have had an impact: the appearance of new causes of
action, such as those created by civil rights, labor, environmental, and
securities laws, and novel theories of recovery; the expanding use of
class actions; and the steep increase in the number of lawyers, particu-
larly those engaged in litigation.8 As a result, litigation activity
mushroomed. There is no empirical evidence that abusive practices
grew disproportionately, but it could be expected that they would in-
crease at least in proportion to the increase in filings. Moreover, re-
straints on attorney behavior were loosening at the time, epitomized
by the near disappearance of restrictions on lawyers' advertising.9 In
addition, the 1980s ushered in an era of unprecedented competitive-
ness in all sectors of the economy, including the legal profession which
saw aggressiveness grow and collegiality decline."0
These developments led to insistent demand for strengthening
the FRCP to curb litigation abuse. Rule 11 as it then stood was not an
effective weapon against excess or abuse in the conduct of litigation.
Judges, disinclined generally to impose sanctions on the participants in
the adversary process, were even more reluctant to find that an attor-
ney had engaged in willful misconduct. Commenting on the Rule's
inutility, the 1983 Advisory Committee's Note (the 1983 Note) stated,
"[t]here has been considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances
plied the proceedings in any cause ... so as to increase costs unreasonably" could be held
liable for "any excess of costs so incurred." Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 21 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988)).
6. See 5A WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1331.
7. Id.;. Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 24 (1984) ("Historically, however, the threat of sanctions has been virtually a
toothless tiger.").
8. Reasons for the expansion of litigation in the United States are discussed in Miller,
supra note 7, at 2-12.
9. For the seminal decision, see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
10. See Miller, supra note 7, at 15-19.
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that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary
action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign
pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate
sanctions.""
The 1983 amendment made major changes in Rule 11, principally
by adopting a standard of objective reasonableness of pleadings, mo-
tions, and papers. Also, once a violation was found, courts were re-
quired to impose sanctions which could include the payment of the
opponent's reasonable expenses incurred as the result of the violation.
What was the purpose of the 1983 amendment? The 1983 Note
appeared to send conflicting signals. The Note began by stating that
"[tihe new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney
and reenforcing those obligations by the impositionh of sanctions.'
12
That language obligated attorneys to conduct "some prefiling inquiry
into both the facts and the law [that was to be] reasonable[ ] under the
circumstances [and under a standard] more stringent than the original
good-faith formula."'1 3 But it went on to'say:
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by
building upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permit-
ting the court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to
a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or
conducting litigation. Greater attention by the district courts
to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanc-
tions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abu-
sive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by
lessening frivolous claims or defenses.' 4
The 1983 Note thus offered two strands of interpretation-controlling
attorney conduct and regulating pleading content-but left open the
question of how they related to each other in the enforcement of Rule
11. That question remained open. As to conduct, it seemed to suggest
standards based on attorney responsibility, that is, professionalism-
avoiding "dilatory tactics"-but also on "bad faith," the latter obvi-
ously much narrower. As to content, it suggested both an abuse of
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 advi-
sory committee's note].
12. Id. (citation omitted).
13. Id. at 198-99 (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 198 (citation omitted).
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process standard and frivolousness, the latter likely to be much more
inclusive.
The 1983 Note's ambiguity quite accurately, if inadvertently, fore-
shadowed the difficulties courts were to encounter in applying Rule
11. Though they had abundant opportunity, the courts never suc-
ceeded in articulating universally accepted and workable standards of
sanctionable conduct and sanctionable content.'- Nor for that matter
has the underlying tension between conduct and content been re-
solved: 6 Is otherwise abusive-appearing conduct excused if pursued
in a meritorious cause? Can an inept investigation be reasonable and,
if so, can it warrant filing what turns out to be a frivolous paper?
At bottom the difficulty may lie in a lack of consensus on the
purpose for which sanctions are to be imposed. Unquestionably, Rule
l1's drafters were concerned over the infliction of unjustified costs on
parties through improper litigation conduct. 7 Although there has
been wide agreement on the Rule's deterrent purpose, there has been
less on whether deterrence is to be achieved primarily through redress
or through punishment.' 8 Beyond these fairly practical concerns lies
the question of whether the Rule is to be administered to serve a
much larger purpose of compelling attorney adherence to "their gen-
eral duty to society and their special duty to the publicly funded judi-
cial system."' 9 As Professor Miller, then the Advisory Committee's
reporter, put it, "[O]nce it is understood that the court system is a
societal resource, not merely the private playpen of the litigants, the
difficult task of discouraging hyperactivity must be undertaken. The
1983 amendments ... represent a modest step in that direction."
20
Other commentators described the purpose to "create a higher
15. See generally VAIRO, supra note 2, §§ 2.03[b], 5.03[a], [b] (detailing problem of
content versus conduct controversy).
16. Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 401 (1990); William W
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1988).
17. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'y, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION:
THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 11 (1989).
18. Id. at 10-12; 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1332; see also Georgene M.
Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189,203-04 (1988) (rejecting use of Rule 11
as fee-shifting device in favor of sanctions serving goals of deterrence).
19. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, at § 1331 (stating rule "mandates that all
signers consider their behavior in terms of the duty they owe to the court system to con-
serve its resources and avoid unnecessary proceedings").
20. Miller, supra note 7, at 19.
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standard of attorney behavior, ''2 1 and "elevate the standards of
practice."' 2
Courts, for the most part, did not subscribe to such lofty goals
and generally adopted a much more modest rationale geared toward
eliminating abusive litigation practices a3 Nevertheless there appears
to be consensus among proponents as well as opponents that the 1983
amendment had a significant effect on practice in the federal courts,
even if the precise nature and extent of that effect was not quantifi-
able. There seems to be wide agreement that Rule 11 accomplished
the principal objective of its drafters: to lead litigants "to stop, think
and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers.'
' 4
Observers agree that lawyers generally are using more care before fil-
ing pleadings and motions.' 5 A Federal Judicial Center survey of
judges found that eighty percent believed that the overall effect of the
Rule was positive though they also acknowledged its potential for
causing satellite litigation and exacerbating relations between coun-
sel.26 But there is disagreement over whether the Rule chilled vigor-
ous advocacy, deterring lawyers from filing marginal yet innovative
and potentially meritorious claims or defenses.a7 Only five percent of
the judges thought it did.-8 There has also been controversy about
whether the Rule has had a disparate impact.-9 The Federal Judicial
Center studied case files in five representative districts. The study dis-
covered that Rule 11 motions and orders targeted plaintiffs more
often than defendants, and that plaintiffs in represented civil rights
21. Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 365
(1983).
22. Edwin A. Rothschild et al., Rule 11: Stop, Think and Investigate, LrrIo., Winter
1985, at 13, 54.
23. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479,483 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The goal of Rule 11
... is not wholesale fee shifting but correction of litigation abuse.").
24. 1983 advisory committee's note, supra note 11, at 192.
25. See VAIRO, supra note 2, §§ 2.01, 2.02[b]; Melissa L. Nelken, The Impact of Federal
Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147,
149-50 (1990); Report of the Committee on Federal Courts: Sanctions and Attorneys'
Fees, New York State Bar Ass'n, 2-3 (1987) (reporting survey was sent to 8000 attorneys-
of whom 20% responded; over 33% reported they had intensified their pre-filing factual
and legal investigation since adoption of amended rule; 86% believed that affirmative in-
quiry requirements of rule were reasonable).
26. Federal Judicial Ctr., Rule 11: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, §§ 1A, 2A (1990) (78% of the 751
judges surveyed responded) [hereinafter Final Report].
27. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 2.02[b][4].
28. See Final Report, supra note 26.
29. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 2.02[b][3].
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cases, as opposed to pro per cases, were targeted disproportionately
and also less frequently than plaintiffs in contract and tort actions.3
The study also showed that the overall use of the Rule was less than
widely believed-activity occurred in only about two to three percent
of the cases and sanctions were imposed in less than a quarter of the
affected cases.
31
Given its deterrent purpose, Rule 11 suffers from the inevitable
weakness of all deterrent devices it cannot be calibrated with preci-
sion. There is always some risk of overdeterrence just as there is a
risk that the intended target may escape. The Rule may to a degree
have been found wanting, suffering from some overdeterrence as well
as from ineffectiveness, in part, at least, because judges have taken
divergent approaches to its interpretation and application. There is
strong evidence, however, that on the whole it has served a useful
purpose in helping to deter frivolous and abusive pleadings.
Nevertheless the complaints and concerns about the 1983 version
of Rule 11 were sufficiently persuasive to lead the Judicial Confer-
ence's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, following lengthy study
and hearings, to propose extensive amendments which, after review
by the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Supreme
Court, became effective on December 1, 1993.
II. THE 1993 AMENDMENTS
A. Their Purpose
The overriding purpose of the 1993 amendments was, as the 1993
Advisory Committee's Notes (the 1993 Notes) state, to remedy
problems perceived to have arisen in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the 1983 revision of Rule 11. But examination of the revised
Rule and the accompanying 1993 Notes shows that the committee was
also motivated by a purpose to expand the enforcement of attorneys'
professional obligations, a purpose that clearly emerges when the
Rule is viewed in the context of other FRCP amendments, in particu-
30. See Final Report, supra note 26, § 1B, 14-15; FJC Directions, Nov. 1991, at 19. The
study found, generally, that Rule 11 activity occurred in 2 to 3% of cases, and that sanc-
tions were imposed in less than 20% of those cases-that is, in 0.4 to 0.6% of all cases in
the study. Sanctions were imposed far more frequently on plaintiffs than on defendants.
Although the incidence of Rule 11 activity was somewhat higher in civil rights cases than in
other categories, the rate at which sanctions were imposed in all civil rights cases was gen-
erally in line with the rate imposed in other categories; the rate at which sanctions were
imposed in represented-as opposed to pro per-cases was lower than in other categories.
31. See Final Report, supra note 26, § 1B at 2-12.
[Vol. 28:7
RULE 11: ENTERING A NEW ERA
lar those to Rule 26. The 1993 Notes state that the Rule "retains the
principle that attorneys... have an obligation to the court to refrain
from conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1. The revision broad-
ens the scope of this obligation, but places greater constraints on the
imposition of sanctions .... "32
Rule 1, of course, calls for the "just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action."33 Conduct that frustrates that objective
certainly is not limited to the filing of a frivolous paper without a prior
reasonable investigation; in fact, conduct of that sort encompasses liti-
gation tactics that many will regard as well within the legal main-
stream. The significance of the amended Rule 11 lies not in enlarging
the content-based prohibitions but rather in its shift of emphasis to
conduct.
With these thoughts concerning the drafters' purposes in mind,
we turn to examine the principal provisions of the 1993 amendments.
B. Representations to the Court
The 1993 amendments retain the general framework of the 1983
version which is founded upon attorney certification of compliance
with Rule l's standards. But the Rule's language has changed in sig-
nificant respects, including these: the Rule permits, subject to con-
straints, pleading on information and belief; the certification is not
limited to the paper as a whole but extends also to the separate claims,
defenses, and legal contentions it contains; and certification of compli-
ance occurs, not only upon the initial filing of a paper, but also upon
the later presenting or advocating of its contents.34 The effect of these
changes is discussed in the following paragraphs.
1. Factual allegations on information and belief
Unequal party access to relevant information creates a common
problem in the administration of Rule 11. In an employment discrimi-
nation case, for example, the relevant data will frequently be in the
possession of the employer. In personal injury litigation, the defend-
ant will lack many relevant facts about the plaintiff. Nevertheless a
litigant may have good reason to believe that a factual basis exists for
a claim or defense but may not have been able to fully ascertain the
facts through prefiling investigation. 35 The amended Rule permits al-
32. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 584.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
34. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 579-80.
35. See, e.g., Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
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legations to be "specifically... identified [as] likely to have eviden-
tiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
or discovery" and it permits denials of factual contentions if "specifi-
cally identified" and "reasonably based on lack of information and
belief."36 The making of such "specifically identified" allegations and
denials, however, "does not relieve litigants from the obligation to
conduct an appropriate investigation into the facts that is reasonable
under the circumstances," nor is it "a license to join parties, make
claims, or present defenses without any factual basis or justification.
Moreover, if evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the party has a duty
under the rule not to persist with that contention.
37
The availability of pleading on information and belief, while eas-
ing access to the court, will not relieve lawyers from their obligation to
refrain from making unqualified allegations lacking evidentiary sup-
port. To the contrary, it will lessen the justification for such allega-
tions and, hence, the courts' tolerance of them.
2. Assessing the paper
One of the troublesome issues under the 1983 version of Rule 11
was whether a paper containing both legitimate and frivolous claims
could be the basis for sanctions. It was argued by some that a paper
which contained any nonsanctionable claims could not be treated as
frivolous. 8 On the other hand, one could say that even when com-
bined with legitimate claims, a frivolous claim could still bring about
the adverse impact on parties and the judicial process that the Rule
was intended to prevent.3 9 Certainly when a complaint joins defend-
ants against whom legitimate claims are stated with others named only
in frivolous claims, the latter group are no less adversely affected than
if they alone had been named.
The amended Rule 11 requires the presenting counsel to certify
that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions" as well as the
"allegations and other factual contentions" in a paper meet the stan-
dards of the Rule.4° The certification therefore clearly runs separately
to each of the claims, defenses, and contentions, not only to the paper
36. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 580.
37. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 585-86.
38. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated en
banc, 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990).
39. See, e.g., Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir.
1987).
40. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 580.
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as a whole. A valid claim, defense, or contention will no longer pro-
vide cover for others that are frivolous or baseless. However, since
sanctions cannot now be imposed unless the opposing party has first
been given an opportunity to withdraw the offending allegation, the
substantial reduction in the punitive consequences of the amendment
should open the way to stricter enforcement of attorneys' professional
obligations.
3. The continuing duty
The courts were divided over whether the 1983 version of Rule 11
imposed on a party a duty that continued after the filing of a paper.
Taking a textual view, most held that compliance with the Rule was to
be determined as of the time of filing and no obligation existed to
correct or abandon a claim or defense once a paper had been filed.
Thus a party could not be sanctioned for pursuing an allegation even
after later developments rendered it entirely baseless where, for ex-
ample, a key supporting witness had repudiated it.
41
The amended Rule 11 goes beyond measuring compliance solely
by reference to the state of affairs at the moment of filing. It provides
that an attorney certifies compliance "[b]y presenting to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading,
written motion, or other paper."'42 This takes the Rule onto new
ground. The 1993 Notes make clear that the Rule "applies only to
assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court. It
does not cover matters arising for the first time during oral presenta-
tions to the court."43 But a litigant may not continue to assert a posi-
tion previously taken in a pleading that has become no longer tenable,
even though the pleading did not violate the Rule at the time it was
filed. Thus, a claim in a pleading that ceases to be tenable may be
sanctionable if not withdrawn, as may be a motion for summary judg-
ment if it is maintained after an intervening deposition discloses the
existence of an arguably material disputed issue of fact.' As the 1993
Notes put it, "[a] litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of
... papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or
submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court and advo-
41. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987); VAIRO, supra note 2, § 5.04[b].
42. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 579 (emphasis added).
43. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 585.
44. Similarly a paper filed originally in state court may become sanctionable after re-
moval if the offending claims or defenses are maintained-that is, "present[ed]." Id.
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cating positions contained in [them]... after learning that they cease
to have any merit."45
The 1993 Notes point out that while "the rule continues to re-
quire litigants to 'stop-and-think' before initially making legal or fac-
tual contentions," it also "emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting
litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is
no longer tenable."46
The amended Rule 11, while not explicitly resolving the tension
between conduct and content, clearly takes a step beyond where the
1983 Rule left off. The Advisory Committee recognized that what oc-
curs at the moment a paper is filed, though important, is not control-
ling in determining whether the aims of Rule 1 will be frustrated since
the harm caused by an offending allegation continues after the filing.
Indeed an allegation may become offensive only after later develop-
ments in the case. Thus, the Advisory Committee enlarged the obliga-
tion of attorneys while lessening their exposure to sanctions.
The heightened obligation imposed by this provision will need to
be administered with great care. The determination whether the filing
of a paper is warranted at the outset of litigation based upon a reason-
able prefiling investigation is likely to be less complicated and ambig-
uous than assessing the justification for continuing to maintain it in
the light of discovery and other developments as the litigation pro-
gresses. Moreover, were the quoted comment from the 1993 Notes
taken literally, it might be read as exposing an attorney to the risk of
sanctions for judgments about the "merits" of a client's case as it un-
folds and more facts become known. Presumably the 1983 Notes'
"cease to have any merit" language contemplates the application of
the same standard that would have been applied had these facts been
known or accessible to the proponent at the time the paper was filed.
But even under that standard, one can expect attorneys will confront
difficult questions: When is a witness's testimony or a document suffi-
ciently conclusive to render a prior allegation baseless? When does an
attorney's hope or expectation that something will turn up in further
discovery justify continuing to "advocate" a position that has suffered
a seemingly fatal blow? This amendment clearly adds a new dimen-
sion to Rule 11, implementing the aims of Rule 1, and reflecting a
point of view expressed earlier by Arthur Miller that the courts must
45. Id.
46. l&
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be treated as a "societal resource, not merely the private playpen of
the litigants."'47
The impact of this continuing duty will, however, be ameliorated
by the "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11, discussed below. Because
the opponent must give notice of intent to move for sanctions with
respect to an allegation, the proponent of that allegation will have an
opportunity to consider whether it should be withdrawn before being
exposed to the risk of sanctions. While the safe harbor provision does
not apply to sanctions imposed on the court's own initiative, subsec-
tion (c)(1)(B) requires the court to enter an order to show cause
describing the specific conduct said to violate the Rule before sanc-
tions may be imposed.
4. Rule 11 and mandatory prediscovery disclosure under
Rule 26(a)(1)
Amended Rule 11 does not stand alone. It must be read in the
context of other FRCP amendments adopted in 1993, in particular the
discovery amendments, which echo the heightened professional obli-
gations imposed by Rule 11 and contain complementary provisions.
Rule 26(a)(1) requires reciprocal disclosure of core information by the
parties prior to discovery: The identity of witnesses likely to have dis-
coverable information relevant to facts alleged with particularity, a
description of documents likely to contain such information, a compu-
tation of claimed damages, and relevant insurance agreements.48 The
prediscovery disclosure requirement of amended Rule 26(a)(1) and
amended Rule 11 complement each other. Compliance with both
rules entails the making of an early and, reasonable investigation:
prior to filing under Rule 11, prior to disclosure under Rule 26. A
party's failure to come forward with some witness and document iden-
tification generally supportive of its pleading when disclosure is due
will raise a question whether one or both of the rules have been vio-
lated: either because the pleading lacks the evidentiary support Rule
11 requires or, even if it does not, because its proponent has not com-
plied with the Rule 26 disclosure requirement.49
47. See Miller, supra note 7, at 19.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 606-07 (1993) [hereinafter Rule 26 Proposed Amendments].
49. There are, of course, limits to the impact of Rule 26(a)(1): Courts may opt out or
modify the requirement, parties may stipulate around it, or a party may deliberately accept
the risk of not alleging facts with particularity in an effort to avoid or delay disclosure of its
own evidence.
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It is perhaps noteworthy that the controversy about Rule 26(a)(1)
has been principally directed at the obligation to produce information
that may be adverse to the disclosing party. Opponents argued that
having to search for, identify, and produce information harmful to
one's case could undermine the adversary process and lawyer-client
relations." But it may well be that it is Rule 26, which requires par-
ties to disclose the information supporting their case, that will have
the greater impact. Disclosure will expose the product of a party's
prefiling inquiry, and inferentially its adequacy, to immediate scrutiny.
Having to reveal through disclosure early in the litigation that a paper
lacks the factual or legal support to which the filing party must certify
should reinforce the "stop and think before filing" purpose of Rule 11.
A party filing a complaint that contains wide-ranging charges of
RICO violations, for example, will be in an exposed position if it has
nothing probative to disclose before discovery can begin. Rule
26(a)(1), together with Rule 11, should be the death knell of the dis-
credited corollary of notice pleading: that the complaint is nothing
more than a ticket to making one's case on discovery.
As a result, the two rules should be mutually reinforcing. The ne-
cessity for avoiding the appearance of noncompliance with Rule 11-
that is, a failure to conduct a reasonable prefiling investigation-will
deter parties from withholding information disclosable under Rule 26.
Conversely, the obligation under Rule 26(a)(1) to disclose informa-
tion gathered during the prefiling investigation will deter parties from
filing until they are able to demonstrate some factual basis for their
allegations.
Another incentive for conducting a reasonable prefiling investiga-
tion is the provision of Rule 26(a)(1) that limits the obligation to dis-
close to "information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity."51 To the extent a party fails to allege facts with particu-
larity, it will be deprived of the benefit of Rule 26(a)(1) by relieving
the opposition of its obligation to make disclosure. A complaint that
alleges in conclusory terms only that a product manufactured by de-
fendant was defective will not obligate the defendant to make disclo-
sure." There will be an incentive, therefore, to obtain specific factual
information through a prefiling investigation in order to be able to
allege facts with particularity in the initial pleading. In those cases
50. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform,
27 GA. L. REv. 1 (1992).
51. Rule 26 Proposed Amendments, supra note 48, at 606-07.
52. ld. at 631.
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where the critical information is in the hands of the opponent and the
ability to conduct a prefiling investigation is limited, the amended
Rule, as noted, gives a qualified right to plead based on information
and belief.
In theory at least a party's case may turn out to have merit even
when its initial disclosure reveals that no prefiling investigation was
conducted. The circumstances of the case will need to be considered
in determining whether the attorney's violation of the certification re-
quirement is sanctionable. As a practical matter, the proponent of
such a pleading would shortly be put to the test, either by a request to
withdraw it under subsection (c)(1)(A) or by a motion for summary
judgment. To successfully oppose the latter, the proponent would
probably have to conduct discovery, and, to obtain leave to do so, 3
would have to make the requisite showing under Rule 56(f).
As in the case of the prefiling investigation duty, the continuing
duty under Rule 11 is complemented by the enlarged obligation to
supplement prior disclosure and discovery responses under amended
Rule 26(e). Rule 26(e) now requires that such disclosure or responses
must be supplemented or corrected whenever a party learns that its
prior disclosure or response has become incomplete or incorrect as a
result of subsequently acquired information-even if correct when in-
itially made.54 The obligation dovetails with that under Rule 11 to
abandon or withdraw an allegation that, as a result of new information
has become no longer tenable.
The interplay of Rules 11 and 26 thus heightens the professional
obligations of attorneys so as to further the aims of Rule 1.1
C. Sanctions
1. Motions for sanctions
Perhaps the most drastic change is the new procedure for invok-
ing Rule 11. A motion must be made separately from any other mo-
tion or paper; no longer may a Rule 11 charge be incorporated into
53. Id. at 619.
54. Id. at 620-22.
55. Other examples of heightened professional obligations under the amended rules
are found in Rule 30(d)(1) providing that "[a]ny objection... during a deposition shall be
stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. A party may
instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a
limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a motion [to suspend the deposi-
tion]"; in Rule 33(b) requiring a party to answer an interrogatory "to the extent [it] is not
objectionable"; and in Rule 4(d)(2) imposing a "duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving
the summons [by waiving service of summons]."
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another motion or responding paper. The motion, as well as a court's
sua sponte order to show cause, must describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate the Rule and must be served on the opponent.
These provisions will constrain what critics have described as a some-
times overly liberal resort to motions for sanctions. Most important, a
motion may not be filed with the court until after the opponent has
been given notice and an opportunity to withdraw or correct the chal-
lenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial.5 6 As
the 1993 Notes state,
These provisions are intended to provide a type of "safe har-
bor" against motions under Rule 11 in that a party will not
be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion
unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that
position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not cur-
rently have evidence to support a specific allegation.5 7
By inducing, if not compelling, opposing lawyers to communicate with
each other, the lafter provision also furthers the aims of Rule 1, as the
amendments ifitend. It reflects a widely held view that much costly
and time-consuming litigation activity could be avoided if lawyers
talked to each other before they acted. 8 Rule 11 contemplates that
"[i]n most cases ... counsel should be expected to give informal notice
to the other party, whether in person or by a telephone call or letter,
of a potential violation before proceeding to prepare ... a Rule 11
motion. ' '
59
Here again, Rule 26(f) contains a complementary requirement
that early in the litigation the parties "meet to discuss the nature and
56. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 581. A motion "shall not be filed
with or presented to the court unless within 21 days after service ... the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention,, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately cor-
rected." Id.
57. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 591.
58. The Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group Report for the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado states, for example:
Most judges agree that professionalism among lawyers has declined steadily
over the last many years. Some attribute that decline to the increase in the
number of lawyers and the resulting competition among lawyers. Almost all of
the judges report that they sometimes must introduce adversaries to each other
because the attorneys have not done so themselves. The failure of lawyers to
confer among themselves to try to resolve some problem in the case, rather than
filing a motion, is cited as a cause of excess cost and delay by about half the
judges.
U.S. District Court, District of Colo., Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group Report 41
(1993).
59. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 591.
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basis of their claims and defenses. '60 Compliance with this Rule cre-
ates a vehicle for addressing, among other issues, a potential Rule 11
violation early in the litigation, thereby minimizing motion activity.
Similar meet and confer provisions are found elsewhere in the
amended rules: in Rule 16, calling on the parties to consider at the
conference, among other things, "the appropriateness and timing of
summary adjudication,"'" thereby minimizing filing of baseless sum-
mary judgment motions; in Rule 26(c), requiring a conference before
filing of a motion for protective order;62 and in Rule 37(a)(2)(A)-(B),
and 37(d), requiring the same in connection with disputes over disclo-
sure and discovery.63
2. Nature of sanctions
The amended Rule 11 makes a significant course correction with
respect to sanctions. First, by substituting "may" for "shall" in the
former Rule, it no longer mandates imposition of sanctions when a
violation is found. It has plainly retreated from the position taken in
the 1983 Advisory Committee's Note that "[t]he new language is in-
tended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions ....
[t]he words 'shall impose' . . . focus the court's attention on the need
to impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses."64 Second, it has
turned away from the compensatory orientation of the former Rule.
The 1983 Note observed that it "buil[t] upon and expand[ed] the equi-
table doctrine permitting the court to award expenses, including attor-
ney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting
or conducting litigation." 65 By way of contrast, the 1993 Notes state:
"Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to com-
pensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it
should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty.
66
The change reflects some concern over possible conflict with the
Rules Enabling Act,67 but more importantly a realization of the po-
60. Rule 26 Proposed Amendments, supra note 48, at 622.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 16, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D 401, 599 (1993). '
62. Rule 26 Proposed Amendments, supra note 48, at 617-18.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 30. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 682-89 (1993).
64. 1983 advisory committee's note, supra note 11, at 198-200.
65. Id. at 198.
66. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 587-88.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); see Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About
Power, 11 HoIoF.A L. REv. 997, 1003 (1983). But see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
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tential of abuse of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device. The prospect of
being able to recover some part of one's attorney fees created a pow-
erful incentive to file a Rule 11 motion. Amended Rule 11(c)(2)
makes clear that the standard for imposing a sanction is "what is suffi-
cient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated."68 The Rule enumerates three alternative
approaches to sanctions: (1) non-monetary sanctions, (2) penalties
paid into court, and (3) if "warranted for effective deterrence," pay-
ment of some or all of the movant's expenses incurred as a direct re-
sult of the violation.69 The Advisory Committee's Notes explain that
"under unusual circumstances, particularly for (b)(1) violations [im-
proper purpose], deterrence may be ineffective unless the sanction not
only requires the person violating the rule to make a monetary pay-
ment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to
those injured by the violation.
'70
This revision is consistent with the emphasis of the amendment
on furthering professional behavior as opposed to sanctioning misbe-
havior. Nonmonetary sanctions are often an adequate and preferable
alternative because nothing more severe may be needed to get an at-
torney's attention and prevent future misconduct. Issuing an ad-
monition or reprimand or mandating attendance at legal education
programs, as suggested in the Advisory Committee's Notes, can in fact
produce positive long-term benefits.7
But the amendment will also create difficulties for courts. In de-
termining an appropriate sanction, courts will need to make a judg-
ment about what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct,
presumably both by the offender and "by others similarly situated.
'72
While some attorneys are punctilious about their conduct and their
reputation, others regard sanctions as a cost of doing business and
perhaps even a part of their macho image; what will be effective to
Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 551-54 (1991) (upholding validity of fee-shifting
sanctions under Rule 11 against challenge based on Rules Enabling Act).
68. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 582.
69. Id. at 582.
70. Id. at 588.
71. Id. at 587.
72. Id. at 582. The Rule directs that sanctions "shall be limited to what is sufficient to
deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added). Is the purpose of the Rule served if the sanctions are
sufficient to deter others though not necessarily the particular offender-who may require
more severe sanctions to be deterred? Or did the drafters intend that a sanction should be
sufficient to deter both? Perhaps the drafters of the amended Rule meant "and" when
they said "or."
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deter one will not be sufficient for others. More generally, how is a
court to determine whether in the particular case fee shifting is "war-
ranted for effective deterrence"? Does such a determination require
finding that neither a nonmonetary sanction nor a penalty paid into
court will be "sufficient" to deter? How could one compare the deter-
rent effect of a penalty with that of having to pay an opponent's costs
in the same amount? Finally, is the court to ignore entirely the costs
inflicted by one party's violation on the other? Recalling the Advi-
sory Committee's stated purpose of having litigants "refrain from con-
duct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1," which include the
"inexpensive determination" of actions, should the court not consider
the monetary consequences of such conduct by a party? In fact, are
not the reasonable costs inflicted by a Rule 11 violation the most ob-
jective criterion for the appropriate sanction, and their assessment the
most effective deterrent, considering that a party about to embark on
conduct that may result in a violation will be able to estimate the
likely cost of its conduct?
Questions aside, however, the amendment of Rule 11(c), by plac-
ing greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions, implements the
drafter's purpose of broadening the scope of attorneys' obligation to
the court. By reducing the potential adverse consequences of a de-
fault, it also reduces the obstacles to heightened expectations of
professionalism.
III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Analysis of the text of the amended Rule 11, in light of the 1993
Notes and the totality of the 1993 amendments, shows that it is in-
tended to, and indeed does, provide for enforcement of heightened
professional obligations of lawyers engaged in civil litigation in the
federal courts. Although up to this time, the FRCP's purpose has
been largely to regulate procedure, the amended FRCP in significant
respects also regulate practice-and behavior-in the courts.73 How
will courts take this analysis into account in interpreting and applying
the new Rule 11? Courts are of course bound by the Rule's text.74
But the text is only the skeleton for which the courts must, as always,
supply the flesh and skin. This was as true under the old Rule as it
73. As noted, the 1983 amendment took the first but modest step in that direction.
74. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989)
("We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning."). At the same time,
however, "any interpretation must give effect to the Rule's central goal of deterrence."
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
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will be under the amended Rule. Though the text contains a clear
direction to emphasize the professional obligations of the bar, and in
certain respects specifies them, it largely leaves it to the courts to de-
fine the contents. The purpose of furthering "the aims of Rule 1" is a
broad charter of professionalism to which the court will need to give
scope and meaning. That is a task that necessarily implicates the exer-
cise of judicial discretion. Though always a concern, such discretion is
inherent in a rule that calls on judges to draw lines. The impact of the
exercise of that discretion will be tempered by the safe harbor and
substantially moderated sanctions provisions, but the scope of discre-
tion nevertheless remains large in defining sanctionable lawyer trans-
gressions in the conduct of civil litigation. And so there will be a need
to think about how that discretion will be informed.
A core element of professionalism in litigation is the lawyer's
duty of candor. The existence of such a duty is not in dispute; as an
officer of the court a lawyer is obligated not to make false or mislead-
ing statements to the court.75 The relevance of that duty to the
amended Rule 11 clearly was an underlying assumption of the draft-
ers. How courts will factor that duty into the administration of the
amended Rule may well become a test of its effectiveness. In any
event it is an issue courts will not be able to avoid; whether they ac-
knowledge that duty or ignore it, their action as much as their inaction
will have a decisive effect on the conduct of civil litigation and on the
prospects for achieving the aims of Rule 1.
A landmark decision on that issue is Golden Eagle Distributing
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.7 6 The trial judge had imposed sanctions on
defendant's counsel for having presented misleading legal arguments
in support of a motion for summary judgment. The motion contended
that the action, which had been removed from the Minnesota state
court to the federal court and then transferred to California under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a),77 should be dismissed because (1) the Minnesota
state court would have dismissed it for forum non conveniens had it
not been removed, (2) in those circumstances federal courts would
apply the law of the transferor, not the transferee district, and (3)
under an early California Supreme Court case, recovery for economic
loss would be barred. In fact there was no authority to support the
first two propositions-courts had never addressed the issue. On the
third, a later California Supreme Court decision, without citing the
75. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
76. Id.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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earlier case, had taken the opposite position. The trial court, while
recognizing that defendants could have made a reasonable argument
for the modification or extension of existing law, imposed sanctions
because the argument as made misrepresented the applicable law,
stating:
The duty of candor is a necessary corollary of the certifica-
tion required by Rule 11. A court has a right to expect that
counsel will state the controlling law fairly and fully; indeed,
unless that is done the court cannot perform its task prop-
erly. A lawyer must not misstate the law, fail to disclose ad-
verse authority (not disclosed by his opponent) or omit facts
critical to the application of the rule of law relied on."
The Ninth Circuit, treating the issue as being "whether Rule 11
requires the courts to enforce ethical standards of advocacy beyond
the terms of the rule itself," reversed. It interpreted Rule 11 as being
intended "to avoid delay and unnecessary expense in litigation."7 9
Describing the trial court's ruling as requiring "argument identifica-
tion," it held: "If, judged by an objective standard, a reasonable basis
for the position exists in both law and fact at the time that the position
is adopted, then sanctions should not be imposed."80
Five judges dissented from the denial of a petition for rehearing
en banc. The dissenting opinion asks, rhetorically:
How can a brief be warranted by existing law if its argument
goes in the face of "directly contrary" authority from the
highest court of the jurisdiction whose law is being argued?
How can a brief be warranted to be a "good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"
78. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal.
1984). The present author was the trial judge. In reaching this conclusion, the judge relied
on Rule 3.3 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983)
which states: "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or
law to a tribunal .... " The comment accompanying the rule states in part:
The advocate's task is to present the client's case with persuasive force. Per-
formance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client is qualified by
the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal....
iegal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes
dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested
exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authori-
ties. Furthermore... an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse author-
ity in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the opposing
party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to
determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.
79. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1536.
80. Id. at 1538.
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when there is not the slightest indication that the brief is ar-
guing for extension, modification or reversal?
8'
Professors Wright and Miller comment at length on Golden Eagle
in their treatise. Noting that "its reasoning and result leave a loophole
between Rule 11 and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
permits attorneys to mislead the court and then hide behind a no-bad-
faith defense," they conclude that the result "is at odds with the stated
intention of the amended rule to 'reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions.., by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attor-
ney and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanc-
tions.' "82 They point out that "[tihe court gave no reason to support
the assertion that there is no relationship between the standards of
behavior demanded by the ABA Model Code and those demanded by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. '8 3 Indeed, as the dissenting
opinion pointed out, the Model Rules, which were adopted in August
1983, and Rule 11, which became effective at the same .time, both
drew their text from the earlier American Bar Association Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.'4
With respect to the possibility of imposing conflicting duties on
counsel, the treatise says:
[I]t is not a violation of any duty to one's client to inform the
court that, because the law is unclear, it may be necessary to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law in order to reach a
desired conclusion. To the contrary, an attorney who delib-
erately refrains from disclosing whether he is asserting ex-
isting law or asking for a modification of the law pursues a
questionable course at best and easily may violate his duty as
an officer of the court.
85
81. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 1987).
82. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1335.
83. Id.
84. 809 F.2d at 588-89. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(2) (1976) (Lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwar-
ranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be
supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CorNucr Rule 3.1 (1983) ("A lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there
is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
85. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1335; see also David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. Rnv. 799, 878 (1992) ("The preceding analysis
shows that the district judge was correct. Chilling zealous advocacy below acceptable
levels does not appear to be a major concern in [the] context [presented by Golden Eagle].
Corporate lawyers have ample incentive to discover and present every colorable argument
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The question that now confronts courts is what effect to give to the
1993 amendments: Can it still be said, as the Ninth Circuit did, that
the duty of candor is an "ethical standard[ ] of advocacy beyond the
terms of the Rule itself[?]" 86 Those amendments, as the earlier dis-
cussion shows, emphasize the professional obligations which formed
the background of the 1983 Rule 11. A textual analysis of the Rule,
illuminated by the drafters' notes, now makes it difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the Rule is intended to do more than stop abuse. It is
an integral part of a new scheme that emphasizes the obligations of
attorneys "[a]s officers of the court,"87 designed to reduce unproduc-
tive adversariness. Its purpose is not only to "retain[ ] the principle
that attorneys ... have an obligation to the court to refrain from con-
duct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1" but also to "broaden[ ] the
scope of this obligation."88 The revision, according to the drafters,
"expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court [and] emphasizes
the duty of candor."89
The duty of candor is implicated in the obligation under Rule 11
to conduct a prefiling investigation reasonable under the circum-
stances since a failure to do so can lead to factual and legal misrepre-
sentations, albeit unintentional.9" But where a prefiling investigation
has been performed, an attorney must be expected to act in conform-
on behalf of their client. What is in danger, however, is the desire or indeed the ability of
these lawyers to exert any moderating influence on their legally sophisticated client. By
failing to consider these embedded controls, the court of appeals undermined professional
independence in the sense of freedom from client domination in precisely the context in
which this goal is most in need of support.").
86. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1539. It has been argued that Rule 11 is not needed to
enforce ethical obligations of attorneys in view of the availability of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and
the court's inherent powers. See id. at 1539, n.3; Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d
557,564-65 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc); VAIRO, supra note 2, § 2.04[d]4. But those provisions
are not a substitute for Rule 11: § 1927 addresses only prolonging of litigation, not particu-
lar filings, and requires proof of bad faith, for example, that counsel "multiplie[d] the pro-
ceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272,275
(7th Cir. 1990). The inherent powers of the court permit it to assess expenses only against
counsel who "willfully abuse judicial processes." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 766 (1980).
87. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 630.
88. Id. at 584.
89. Id. at 584-85.
90. Lloyd v. Schlag, 884 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving copyright infringement
action where plaintiff had failed to discover prior to filing that his predecessor in title had
failed to perfect requisite copyright registration); see also Brown v. Federation of State
Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (7th Cir. 1987).
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ity with it or else its purpose would be defeated. 91 Thus, sanctions
were imposed where a union made a renewed motion for an order
compelling arbitration without disclosing that its prior motion on the
same ground had been denied and was on appeal, and also failed to
disclose that a determinative arbitration was then pending.92 Sanc-
tions may be appropriate also where a party maintains a factual posi-
tion that flies squarely in the face of deposition testimony,93 or makes
deceptive representations to the court.94 A particularly egregious in-
stance of nondisclosure occurred where the defendant in a diversity
action concealed the facts concerning its citizenship by providing eva-
sive responses to plaintiff's discovery, leading plaintiff to continue the
litigation at great expense while the defendant rested assured that any
adverse judgment would be a nullity for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.95
Imposition 'of sanctions for violation of the duty of candor with
respect to matters of fact is less controversial than with matters of law.
Legal issues are often close, and Rule 11 should not become a vehicle
for chilling legitimate advocacy. 96 Nevertheless a failure to conduct a
reasonable legal investigation resulting in the assertion of frivolous
claims plainly violates the Rule. 7 And, as the First Circuit has held,
91. See William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. Rnv. 1013, 1023 (1988)
("It would therefore defeat the purpose of the prefiling investigation requirement if attor-
neys were left free to conceal or misrepresent critical adverse information.").
92. Pipe Trades Council v. Underground Contractors Ass'n, 835 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th
Cir. 1987) (reserving "whether sanctions were appropriate based on violation of a duty of
candor").
93. Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 263-65.(7th Cir. 1985) (involving defendant who
claimed to have entered house in exigent circumstances to save plaintiff's life when testi-
mony showed that defendant entered to make arrest and supplied no corroboration of
exigent circumstances).
94. Carroll v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 955 F.2d 1107,1116 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992) (misstate-
ments of fact); Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1990) (moving party in
postjudgment motion reversed its position whether there were triable issues precluding
summary judgment and misrepresented statements made by trial judge handling earlier
proceedings in case); Mays v. Chicago Sun-Times, 865 F.2d 134, 140 (7th Cir. 1989) (false
statements about defendant's employment policies and practices); In re Ronco, 838 F.2d
212, 218 (7th Cir. 1988) (false statements in application for continuance in that applicant
failed to disclose prior representation of party seeking continuance and true nature of
"new evidence"); Blackwell v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 807 F.2d 914, 915-
16 (11th Cir. 1987) (failure to disclose prior waiver of claim for attorney fees).
95. Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96,
97 (D.NJ. 1985).
96. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987).
97. Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987).
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"the duty of reasonable inquiry includes ...a duty of reasonable
disclosure."98
The more difficult case is presented where counsel misrepresents
the applicable law, asserting that the paper is warranted by existing
law when it is not even though it might be justified by a "nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or the establishment of new law."99 It was at this point that the Ninth
Circuit in Golden Eagle drew the outer limit of Rule 11, holding that
requiring what it called "argument identification" would be inconsis-
tent with counsel's obligations to the client, chill advocacy, and create
burdens for the courts and the parties.10° As the court viewed it, the
fact that an argument in support of an otherwise valid paper is frivo-
lous does not warrant a finding that the paper is frivolous.101
Most courts that have addressed the issue have not adopted the
Ninth Circuit's view.'0 The Eleventh Circuit held that "[c]ounsel had
a [Rule 11] duty to acknowledge [in the complaints or memoranda
filed] that the binding precedent of this Circuit disfavored Plaintiffs'
position .... Then Counsel could have in good faith requested the
trial court to recognize the law expounded [elsewhere] ... ,o. In
affirming sanctions in another case, that court said:
98. Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 1990) (involving fail-
ure to disclose that statutory notice period requirement precluded application for TRO).
99. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 1, at 580.
100. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540.
101. Id. at 1540-41. The court also rejected application of Rule 11 to failure to cite
adverse authority essentially on the ground that it would impose undue burdens on parties.
Id. at 1541-42.
102. The Third Circuit adopted that view in Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d
90, 96 (3d Cir. 1988).
103. DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755,766 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that plain-
tiff's counsel's failure to acknowledge clear precedent entitling defendants to absolute im-
munity violated Rule 11), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 952 (1990); see also Maciosek v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield United, 930 F.2d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that counsel failed to cite
or refer to case brought by counsel in same district in which identical legal contentions had
been rejected); Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir. 1987) (allowing
sanctions on appeal imposed for counsel's "ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially
dispositive authority against a litigant's contention does not exist"); Bolls v. Middendorf's,
Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1583, 1584 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (holding that counsel's belated assertion
that counsel was attempting to change existing law was Rule 11 violation).
The existence of an ethical duty to disclose "legal authority in the controlling jurisdic-
tion known to [the attorney] to be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is
not disclosed by opposing counsel" has long been accepted. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1976) (originally adopted in 1969); the same pro-
vision is found in the CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT § 22(c), at 12 (Am. College of Trial
Lawyers (1994).
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The appellants purported to describe the law to the district
court in the hope that the description would guide and in-
form the court's decision. With apparently studied care,
however, they withheld the fact that the long-awaited deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Florida had been handed
down. This will not do. The appellants are not redeemed by
the fact that opposing counsel subsequently cited the control-
ling precedent. The appellants had a duty to refrain from
affirmatively misleading the court as to the state of the law.
They were not relieved of this duty by the possibility that
opposing counsel might find and cite the controlling prece-
dent .... 104
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed sanctions because plaintiff
"has not only failed to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry, as re-
quired by Rule 11 but also failed to explain how its claim was 'war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.' "105 The Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the imposition of sanctions for falsely asserting that a motion
for a stay automatically stays enforcement of a judgment, noting that
"[w]e do not want to discourage vigorous advocacy, but an advocate
must represent his client within the existing structure of the law, and
not some imagined version of it."'10 6 Both the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits have affirmed sanctions for legal contentions though a com-
petent attorney could have made a colorable argument. 10 7 And even
104. Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 846 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1988).
105. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Association of Flight Attendants, 864 F.2d 173,
177 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 11).
106. Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Borowski v, DePuy,
Inc., 850 F.2d 297,305 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that counsel failed to cite controlling author-
ity and misstated applicable law); In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985); Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 1987) ("When counsel represent
that something cleanly rejected by the Supreme Court is governing law, then it is appropri-
ate to conclude that counsel are not engaged in trying to change the law; counsel either are
trying to buffalo the court or have not done their homework. Either way, Rule 11 requires
the court to impose a sanction-for the protection of the judicial process as much as to
relieve the financial burden that baseless litigation imposes on the other side."), cert. de-
nied, 485 U.S. 901 (1985).
107. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 680 (10th Cir. 1990); Mars Steel
Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Because Rule 11 is
addressed to conduct (the adequacy of the pre-filing investigation) rather than to results, a
motion may be sanctionable even though something could have been said in its behalf....
Litigants 'may not pretend that the law favors their view and impose on the court or their
adversaries the burden of research to uncover the basic rule.' " (citation omitted)) (quoting
In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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in the Ninth Circuit, notwithstanding Golden Eagle, the notion of a
duty of candor survives.1"'
In considering the impact of the 1993 amendment, its legislative
history must be noted. The Spring 1991 draft of the amendment pro-
vided that an assertion in a pleading must be "warranted by existing
law or, if specifically identified as such, by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."'10 9 The itali-
cized portion was eliminated from the final version of the amendment.
The 1993 Notes now state: "Although arguments for a change of law
are not required to be specifically so identified, a contention that is so
identified should be viewed with greater tolerance under the rule." 10
While the 1991 proposal would have had the effect of specifically
overruling Golden Eagle, its elimination cannot fairly be interpreted
as reflecting a purpose to overrule those cases that do not follow
Golden Eagle. The necessary inference to be drawn from the 1993
Notes is that arguments for a change of law are not immune from
sanctions; while a failure to appropriately identify an argument is not
invariably ground for sanctions, identification of the argument may be
reason not to impose them. Clearly the degree to which counsel has
made disclosure to the court may be relevant to the determination
whether an argument qualifies as nonfrivolous under the amended
Rule 11.11
The cited cases are persuasive authority for taking the duty of
candor into account in assessing compliance with Rule 11. It is diffi-
cult to see how an argument can be regarded as nonfrivolous if it ig-
nores controlling authority or pretends to be supported by nonexisting
authority. The prefiling investigation requirement would have little
108. See Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 740 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that "Tenneco's motion did not discuss, or even mention, TECA's alternative hold-
ing that the EPAA could stand on retroactivity grounds. This Tenneco should not have
done. The trial court's award of Rule 11 sanctions for this motion was justified because the
motion, by ignoring a portion of existing law, was not 'warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.'" (quoting FED.
R. Cirv. P. 11)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988); see also United States v. Stringfellow, 911
F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that counsel "should not be able to proceed with
impunity in real or feigned ignorance" of controlling authority (quoting Golden Eagle, 801
F.2d at 1542)).
109. JosEPH, supra note 2, at 204 (emphasis added).
110. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 3, at 587.
111. See JOSEPH, supra note 2, at 210 ("[A]ny failure to address existing law-or the
failure to do so candidly, coming to grips with adverse authority-militates against a find-
ing that the paper represents a nonfrivolous argument for a change of law."). Note that the
text of the rule was changed from "good faith argument" to "non-frivolous argument" to
emphasize the controlling objective standard. 146 F.R.D. at 586.
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meaning if counsel, when challenged, could excuse a failure to take
into account controlling adverse precedent by simply claiming an in-
tention to argue for its revision.
Nor is the duty of candor inconsistent with the adversary process
and the lawyer's duty to a client.112 Clients have no claim to an attor-
ney's loyalty that knows no ethical bounds. Judge John Noonan put it
this way: "A client has as little right to the presentation of false argu-
ments as he has to the presentation of false testimony. No conflict
exists when a lawyer confines his advocacy by his duty to the
court.""' 3 The lawyer's duty as an officer of the court is more than a
ceremonial attribute. In the adversary process, the judge is not an
independent actor but must look to the lawyers to present the facts
and the law on which to base a decision. If the lawyers' presentations
are tainted by falsehood and concealment, that taint will infect the
decision of the court." 4 As Judge Easterbrook has pointed out, sanc-
tions may be needed as much "for the protection of the judicial pro-
cess as ... to relieve the financial burden that baseless litigation
imposes on the other side.""
' 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Critics of Rule 11, such as Dean Vairo writing in this Review,
1 6
argue that the Rule is moving lawyers from the traditional model of
an independent legal profession. She sees Rule 11 as "dramatically
chang[ing] the dynamics of the attorney-client relationship, shifting
the attorney's duties away from client advocacy toward judicial effi-
ciency and case management as an officer of the court."117 These ob-
servations raise the important question of what is meant by an
112. Note that the Golden Eagle court repeatedly stressed in this connection that sanc-
tions under Rule 11 were mandatory, which is no longer true under the 1993 amendments.
Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1541-42.
113. Golden Eagle, 809 F.2d 584, 589 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
114. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1976) ("The complexity
of the law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless the pertinent
law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the
applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before
it.").
115. Szabo Food, 823 F.2d at 1082; see also Wilkins, supra note 85, at 855-56 (discussing
similar reasoning underlying NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124
F.R.D. 120, 132 (W.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 32
(1991)).
116. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Past as Prologue, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 39 (1994).
117. Id. at 42.
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"independent legal profession."' 18 Dean Vairo takes as an object les-
son the failure of the legal profession in Nazi Germany to defend indi-
vidual rights against a brutal and oppressive regime. The lesson she
draws from that history is that if lawyers must worry about their re-
sponsibility to the court as much as about the interests of their clients,
there is a danger that they will be co-opted by the judicial system to
the detriment of their clients. 19
There can be no quarrel with the general proposition that an in-
dependent bar is a vital part of a democratic society operating under
the rule of law. Dean Vairo quotes Justice Jackson's observation in
Hickman v. Taylor 2 ° that "'the lawyer and the law office are indis-
pensable parts of our administration of justice'" and that " '[t]he wel-
fare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of prime
consequence to society.' ")121 But it also seems hardly disputable that
lawyers, as important actors in the administration of the rule of law,
are themselves subject to rules and obligations. As Justice Murphy
put it, writing for the Court in Hickman, "Historically, a lawyer is an
officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of jus-
tice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients."' 22
Quoting Professor Gordon, Dean Vairo takes as her model of
lawyer independence" 'the ideal of liberal advocacy.""'  But the dif-
ficulty with that ideal, as Professor Gordon points out, -" 'is that it is a
recipe for total sabotage of the legal framework.' "124 Professor
Gordon notes that under such a scheme, "lawyers' roles begin and end
with vigorously pursuing their clients' interests within the limits of the
law .... [This position] rests on incoherent premises and leads to
indefensible conclusions .... [It] appears to license an untempered
adversarial advocacy which when aggregated could easily nullify the
purposes of any and every legal regime."'1  It is ironic, too, that Dean
118. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1,
2-6 (1988) (quoting eminent lawyers on meaning of professional independence); Wilkins,
supra note 85, at 853 (discussing multiple meanings of lawyer independence).
119. Gordon, supra note 118, at 2-6; see Wilkins, supra note 85, at 860 (recognizing that
attempted analogy breaks down because it ignores existence in this country of rules of
professional conduct that would have been violated by actions German authorities
coerced).
120. Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
121. Vairo, supra note 116, at 45 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 514-15 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
122. 329 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added).
123. Vairo, supra note 116, at 43.
124. Gordon, supra note 118, at 20.
125. Id. at 71-72.
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Vairo should find support for her conception of independence in
Judge Sporkin's plaintive queries: "Where were [lawyers] and [w]hy
didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the[se]
transactions?"' 26 What the judge was bemoaning was the failure of
lawyers to exercise their independent professional judgment in the
savings and loan debacle, not their failure to serve their clients un-
questioningly. The true concern of lawyer independence is not free-
dom from the restraint of professional obligations but independence
from their clients; as Sol Linowitz observed regretfully in a recent in-
terview, "'We've lost the ability to differentiate between what you
can do and what you ought to do, .... [L]awyers have relinquished
their independent judgment in favor of giving clients what they
want.'
'1 2 7
While one can, of course, only speculate about what Lord
Brougham had in mind when he opened his spirited defense of Queen
Caroline with the words, "[t]o save [his] client by all means and ex-
pedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons ... is [the law-
yer's] first and only duty,"'" it is well to remember the context in
which that statement was made, the representation of a client con-
fronted by the power of the King and his government in whose de-
fense her attorney intended to impeach the King's title.129 It is one
thing to defend the independence of the bar to take unpopular cases
and oppose entrenched power-courageous advocacy is an honored
tradition in the American legal profession. 3 ° It is quite another, how-
ever, to claim that independence immunizes misrepresentation and
concealment of the truth and harassment of and the infliction of un-
reasonable cost and delay on one's opponents. It is doubtful that
Lord Brougham would have considered the latter to have been in-
cluded in the former.
To examine Rule 11 through the lens of civil rights cases alone
affords a misleading view. Those cases represent only a small piece of
the universe of litigation in which Rule 11 operates. The evidence,
126. Vairo, supra note 116, at 50 (quoting Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F.
Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (alteration in original).
127. Linda Greenhouse, At The Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at B16 (quoting Sol
Linowitz).
128. 2 Proceedings in the House of Lords, Trial of Queen Caroline 7 (Duncan Stevenson
& Co. ed. 1820).
129. See LLOYD P. STRYKER, FOR THE DEFENSE-THOMAS ERSKINE 560-61 (1949).
130. See Wilkins, supra note 85, at 860 (describing various ways in which independence
serves important societal values, including "dissuad[ing] recalcitrant clients from under-
mining long-term legal values.").
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moreover, shows that civil rights cases have not been disproportion-
ately impacted and that much of the sanctions activity was directed at
plaintiffs who were not represented by counsel. 3' Linda Brown
should not provide cover for lawyers who make baseless charges or
assert frivolous defenses, subverting the justice system and inflicting
harm on their opponents. Linda Brown's case' 32 sought the Supreme
Court's reversal of a position which, though previously taken by the
Court, was one whose days were clearly numbered. 133 The Rule spe-
cifically contemplates argument for reversal of existing law; it merely
asks that the argument be nonfrivolous and in 1954 it was not frivo-
lous to argue that the "separate but equal" doctrine was no longer
viable as applied to public schools.
None of this is said to make light of the legitimate concern that
lawyers must be free to represent their clients without fear of reprisal
or intimidation by the court. The amended Rule 11 incorporates safe-
guards to reduce the risks of the sanctions lawyers face. But remov-
ing-or lessening-the obligations and responsibilities of lawyers as
officers of the court is not necessary-nor, for that matter, desirable-
to enable lawyers to serve the rightful interests of their clients. Vigor-
ous advocacy is consistent with prefiling investigations and candor to-
ward the court. 34 Moreover a system in which lawyers are
unrestrained by the obligations of the Rule exposes other parties to
abuse, and their interests must be considered equally with the inter-
ests of those who may be restrained by Rule 11. Such a system,
viewed from a neutral perspective, impairs the access of all parties to
131. See Final Report, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
132. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsToRy OF AMERICAN LAW 579 (1973).
After 1940, the changing attitude of the Supreme Court was very noticeable.
The black man's legal progress was incremental at first. In a series of cases, the
Supreme Court declared this or that situation or practice (segregated law schools,
for example) unconstitutional; but it did not want or dare to deny that segregation
had some warrant in law.... Its decisions were clearly compromises; the blacks
won, most of the time, in the particular case; on the other hand, the legality of
segregation itself was not touched. The Court came closer to the heart of the
system in Shelley v. Kraemer [334 U.S. 1] (1948). This struck down, as unenforce-
able, land covenants that forbade sale or rental of property to blacks.
Id. (footnote omitted).
134. As a practical matter, of course, a client is better served by a lawyer sufficiently
competent to realize, in the words of Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court (formerly of Harvard Law School) that, "[a] brief or argument
impresses [the court] in the degree to which it is willing actually to face rather than mask or
evade the weaknesses of that side of the case." Benjamin Kaplan, Book Review, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 528, 531 (1981) (reviewing FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLEC-
TIONS FROM THE APPELLATE BENCH (1980)). One might ask whether a justice system
ought not to be designed to encourage competent lawyering rather than to denigrate it.
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justice and thus defeats the very purpose the critics of the Rule wish to
serve. Critics may argue that the remedy ought to be found outside
the courts, lest the courts assume too much power over lawyers. But
abusive conduct needs to be dealt with where and when it occurs for
victims to be adequately protected and such conduct deterred.
These general considerations vindicate the need for Rule 11. By
necessity it is a rule of discretion and as such it requires courts to draw
lines. Critics argue that the discretion given courts creates the danger
of chilling advocacy; if lawyers have to worry about crossing the line,
they may be inhibited from giving effective representation to their cli-
ents.'35 It is difficult to evaluate the chilling argument: Is it that law-
yers have been deterred from asserting claims or defenses for which
they had no sufficient factual support, or to assert a legal argument
rejected by courts in the jurisdiction and not supported by logic or
analogous authority? Or is it that lawyers are deterred from filing
actions designed to extract nuisance settlements? At what point
should society become concerned that the assertion of legitimate in-
terests is being frustrated?
Putting aside the inherent vagueness of the chilling argument, the
concern about the necessity of lawyers having to observe lines defin-
ing their professional obligation seems curious. Trial lawyers must
draw such lines constantly: advising a client about answering an em-
barrassing question at a deposition; determining how to handle a com-
promising paper in the course of document production; deciding how
to respond to an intrusive interrogatory without unnecessarily disclos-
ing a valuable lead to an opponent; deciding whether to offer the testi-
mony of a witness of doubtful truthfulness. These are the daily grind
of the lawyer's work, implicating professional obligations, potential
conflicts with one's client's interests, and the risk of sanctions. Rule
11 simply calls on lawyers to do more of the same.
It is the business of lawyers and judges to draw lines. One cannot
escape the necessity for doing so by moving the line; there would be
no fewer close calls if first base were moved farther from home
plate.136 But would litigants, lawyers, and courts be better off if the
135. The risks have been greatly reduced by the discretionary character of sanctions and
the safe harbor provision of the amended rule, and can be further reduced if judges make it
clear, for example by issuing guidelines, what they expect of lawyers appearing in their
court.
136. See Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ. 1255, 1336 (1988) ("Yogi Berra has been
accused of another famous saying: 'We could eliminate all those close plays at first base if
only we moved the bag one foot further from home plate.' ").
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line were moved to enlarge the playing field for unprofessional con-
duct-if the Rule were limited, say to wilfull violations? Moving the
line in that direction might reduce the volume of Rule 11 activity. But
it will also lower the expectations of professional conduct. Lessening
professional obligations will bring Gresham's law into play, leading
standards of behavior to sink to the lowest common denominator. As
I suggested early in the life of Rule 11: "Misconduct, once tolerated,
will breed more misconduct and those who might seek relief against
[it] will instead resort to it in self-defense.
'137
None of this is to say that administration of Rule 11 will be easy.
The Rule places a heavy burden on judges, one many judges would
just as soon pass up. Judges have an obligation to ensure that the
consequences Dean Vairo fears will not come to pass, to use the Rule
with care and restraint. Judges, like lawyers, can stop and think
before imposing sanctions, minimizing mistakes;138 and they have it
within their power, through sensible case management, to prevent the
eruption of satellite litigation. But judges also have an obligation to
maintain the fairness of the justice process. When one party engages
in litigation abuse in violation of the Rule, others suffer that abuse.
When the Rule enforces the lawyers' "obligation to the court to re-
frain from conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1,1'113 it does not
simply, as Dean Vairo puts it, subordinate client interests to the ideals
of "judicial efficiency and case management."" ° The purpose of Rule
1 is to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." It serves the interests of litigants as well as those of the
system. The new emphasis in Rule 11 and Rule 26, and elsewhere on
professionalism, and the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court
lends substance to the general principle of Rule 1. If lawyers perform
their obligations as officers of the court, unnecessary expense and de-
lay will be avoided and just outcomes will be promoted.
141
137. William W Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 205 (1985).
138. Rule 11 is no more free of mistakes in its administration than any other rule of law.
It should not be evaluated on the basis of instances where mistakes have been made if,
overall, it has filled a useful purpose.
139. 1993 advisory committee's note, supra note 3, at 584; see supra text accompanying
note 30.
140. Vairo, supra note 116, at 42.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 97.
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